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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this Virgin Islands automobile accident case, 
evidence that an employee was driving a company car for his own 
convenience, together with a presumption of vicarious liability 
on the part of the employer, raised a question for the jury to 
resolve.  Because the trial court granted a partial judgment as a 
matter of law against the employer on the respondeat superior 
issue, we will reverse and remand for a new trial. 
 For guidance on the retrial, we note that an 
unsupported opinion by an actuarial expert on the plaintiff's 
future earnings should not be received into evidence.  We also 
conclude that the failure of defense counsel to advise the 
plaintiff's lawyer of an interview with an attending physician is 
not an adequate ground to exclude that doctor's testimony. 
 Plaintiff Antonio Williams was injured on St. Croix, 
Virgin Islands on December 12, 1990 when his pickup truck 
collided with an automobile owned by defendant Esso and operated 
by Joseph Rene, one of its employees.  Williams sued both Esso 
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and Rene in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  At the 
conclusion of the evidence at the trial, on the plaintiff's 
motion, the court dismissed Rene from the case.  The jury then 
awarded plaintiff a verdict of $4.5 million against Esso.  The 
district court denied Esso's post-trial motions.  Williams v. 
Rene, 886 F. Supp. 1214 (D.V.I. 1995). 
 Esso had assigned the automobile in question to the 
position held by one of its employees, Helen Sia.  In carrying 
out her duties as a sales representative, Sia traveled frequently 
to visit various customers in the Virgin Islands.  Esso permitted 
her to take the company car home after work and to use it for 
personal matters.   
 Sia's office was located about a quarter of a mile from 
the St. Croix Airport Terminal and was separated from it by the 
"Esso Yard."  On some occasions, she would drive from her home to 
the airport terminal to meet with customers.  At other times, she 
would travel directly from her residence to her office.  If it 
became necessary during the work day to go to the airport 
terminal, Sia would either walk, drive the company car, or be 
"shuttled" by another Esso employee who might be available.    
 On the evening of December 11, 1990, the day before the 
accident, Sia drove the company car to her home with a passenger, 
her co-employee Rene, whose own vehicle had broken down.  When 
they arrived at Sia's residence, she turned the car over to Rene, 
who then drove it to his home, some distance away.  The 
understanding was that Rene would return the automobile to Sia at 
her home the following morning.  She would then drive to the 
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airport for a business appointment there, dropping Rene off at 
his job site.    
 Rene was a crew leader in the Esso group that refueled 
planes at the St. Croix Airport.  He was not Sia's supervisor nor 
did she supervise him.  No supervisory person authorized Rene to 
drive the car on this occasion.   
 The accident occurred not long after Rene left his 
home, between 6:45 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., and while he was en route 
to Sia's home.  The record does not disclose when Sia and Rene 
were to report to work, but it may be assumed that the starting 
times were after the hour at which the accident occurred. 
 At the close of the evidence, the trial court granted 
the plaintiff's motion for a partial judgment as a matter of law, 
holding Esso responsible under respondeat superior principles. 
Plaintiff also moved to dismiss Rene as a defendant "conditioned 
on the granting of the motion for respondeat superior and . . . 
seek its damages solely from Esso as a result of its employee in 
the course and scope of his employment."  That motion was also 
granted and the case went to the jury with Esso as the sole 
defendant.   
 Defendant appealed, asserting that the district court 
erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on the agency issue 
and in failing to grant a remittitur or order a new trial because 
of the excessiveness of the verdict.   
I. 
 The plaintiff's theory of liability against Esso is 
based on respondeat superior, that is, that an employer is 
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responsible for the negligence of its employees that occurs 
within the course and scope of their employment.  The employer's 
liability is vicarious and secondary to that of the employee, 
which is primary.  The relationship was explained in Builders 
Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (Pa. 1951):  "[T]he person 
primarily liable is the employee or agent who committed the tort, 
and the employer or principal may recover indemnity from him for 
the damages which he [the employer] has been obliged to pay." 
Accord Sochanski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 F.2d 45, 50 (3d 
Cir. 1982); Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378 F.2d 601, 605 (3d 
Cir. 1967).  The Restatement (Second) of Agency is in agreement. 
Section 401 comment (d) reads, "a servant who, while acting 
within the scope of employment, negligently injures a third 
person, although personally liable to such person, is also 
subject to liability to the principal if the principal is thereby 
required to pay damages."  See also Restatement of Restitution  
§ 96 (1937). 
 Throughout the litigation, the parties seemed to assume 
that the liability of Esso and Rene was joint and several.  This 
misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of Rene's primary 
responsibility led to a number of errors during the proceedings. 
For example, in her opening remarks to the jury, the plaintiff's 
counsel said ". . . if Mr. Rene was operating that vehicle in the 
course and scope of his employment, then his employer is the one 
who's responsible to pay the damages and that's Esso.  And the 
law says if Mr. Rene was not in the course and scope of his 
employment, then Mr. Rene is liable for those damages."   
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 These comments, of course, are a misstatement of the 
law.  Rene, as the primary tortfeasor, would be liable in any 
event for his negligence in causing the accident without regard 
to whether Esso was secondarily liable.  Esso would be 
responsible only if Rene were negligent and his conduct occurred 
during the course and scope of his employment.  Esso's liability 
would be vicarious only, but Rene's conduct would be the sole, 
active negligence that caused the accident. 
 We turn then to the scope of employment issue.  Because 
the Restatements furnish the guiding common law in the Virgin 
Islands, we look to sections 228 and 229 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 4 (1967). 
 Restatement section 228(1)(a),(b) provides that conduct 
of a servant is within the scope of employment if it is the kind 
he is employed to perform and it occurs substantially within the 
authorized time and space limits.  Section 228(2) states that 
conduct is not within the scope of employment if it is "too 
little actuated by a purpose to serve the master."   
 Comment d to section 229 is particularly pertinent 
here.  It discusses the "going to and from work" situation and 
notes the importance of ascertaining "whether the vehicle is 
supplied primarily for the purpose of assisting the [employer's] 
work, or for the purpose of assisting the employee to perform 
what is essentially his own job of getting to . . . work." Simply 
because the employer provides a vehicle "does not establish that 
those who avail themselves of it are within the scope of 
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employment while upon it, especially if the use is merely 
casual."  Id. 
 The general rule is that employees are not within the 
scope of their employment while traveling to and returning from 
work.  That principle was recognized by the Territorial Court of 
the Virgin Islands in McFarlane v. Jones Masonry, 25 V.I. 43 
(Terr. Ct. 1990).  See also Charles v. Mitchell, 21 V.I. 478 
(D.V.I. 1985).  There may be some circumstances that take a case 
out of the general rule, for example, when there are express 
instructions by the employer or when the trip serves some 
specific purpose of the employer other than merely providing for 
the presence of the employee at the work place.  See, e.g., 
Caldwell v. A.R.B., Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986).   
 In Pacheco v. United States, 409 F.2d 1234, 1237 (3d 
Cir. 1969), we held that, generally speaking, proof of a 
defendant's ownership of a vehicle and of its operation at the 
time of the accident by an agent of the defendant creates a 
presumption that the driver was acting within the scope of 
employment.  As we indicated in the opinion, that presumption is 
rebuttable.  Id. 
 Federal Rule of Evidence 302 provides that the effect 
of a presumption is determined by state law whenever it supplies 
the rule of decision on a claim.  Assuming, without deciding, 
that the Virgin Islands statute on presumptions, V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 5, § 812 (1967), governs here, Esso had the burden of 
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proving that Rene was not acting within the scope of his 
employment once plaintiff established the Pacheco presumption. 
 The standard of review for the grant of a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law varies according to whether the 
moving party has the burden of proof.  Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. 
Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 1976).  Because 
Esso had the burden of proof on the respondeat superior issue, 
the grant of the plaintiff's motion can be sustained "only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, there is no question of material fact for the jury, 
and any verdict other than the one directed would be erroneous 
under the governing law."  Tait v. Armor Elevator Co., 958 F.2d 
563, 569 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 
1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
 The record in this case contains ample evidence to 
rebut a Pacheco presumption.  Rene's employment at the airport 
was not the type of job that required travel by automobile over 
the Island.  Rene left his home between 6:45 and 7:00 a.m.  The 
collision occurred shortly thereafter, apparently before he was 
to report for work at the airport.  At the time of the collision, 
he was en route to Sia's home to turn the car over to her.  Sia, 
a co-employee, had furnished the car as a favor to Rene to get 
him from her home to his and back.  No one in a supervisory 
position at Esso had authorized or directed Rene to use the car 
on the day of the accident, or to pick up Sia.   
 Plaintiff produced some evidence that, at various times 
in the past, some of Esso's employees had been authorized during 
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working hours to drive to employees' homes in order to bring them 
to the work place.  That testimony was general and did not 
establish a clear policy, nor did it demonstrate that Rene had 
been directed to bring Sia to work.  In this context, it is 
important to note, as the Restatement points out, the distinction 
between an employer's permission to drive a company car for 
personal errands and directions for the use of the automobile on 
the employer's business.  The mere fact that Esso had allowed its 
employees to use its vehicles to bring other employees to work in 
the past did not establish that Rene was within the scope of 
employment.   
 Although plaintiff was entitled to a Pacheco 
presumption, there was adequate evidence to support a finding 
that Rene was using the automobile for his own personal 
convenience and not on the business of Esso.  Consequently, the 
respondeat superior question should have been submitted to the 
jury.  It was error, therefore, to grant judgment against Esso on 
the vicarious liability issue.  Accordingly, a new trial must be 
granted.   
 At this juncture, the question arises whether the new 
trial should be granted only as to liability without vacating the 
damage award.  In Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 
283 U.S. 494 (1931), the Supreme Court held that even if error as 
to one issue requires a new trial, it need not include other 
separate points that were properly decided.  If the issue of 
damages, however, is so intertwined with liability that one 
cannot be submitted to the jury independently of the other 
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without confusion and uncertainty, then a new trial must extend 
to all issues.  Id. at 500-01.  Accord Simone v. Golden Nugget 
Hotel & Casino, 844 F.2d 1031, 1040 (3d Cir. 1988); Vizzini v. 
Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754, 759 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
 This appeal presents a unique circumstance that has a 
bearing on the appropriate scope of a new trial.  The district 
court granted the plaintiff's request to dismiss defendant Rene 
just before the case was submitted to the jury.  The dismissal 
was conditional, that is, dependent on a judgment as a matter of 
law against Esso on the respondeat superior issue.  The situation 
thus created may fairly be said to come within the purview of a 
comment in a leading treatise:  "When fewer than all defendants 
are dismissed voluntarily, . . . the court retains plenary power 
to reinstate those defendants until the claim has been 
adjudicated as to the remaining defendants."  9 Charles A. Wright 
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure  § 2367 at 323 
(1995).   
 Because the respondeat superior ruling must be set 
aside, so too must Rene's dismissal be vacated.  The district 
court acquiesced in the limited effect of the plaintiff's motion, 
and it would be inappropriate, as well as unfair, to hold at this 
point that Rene would no longer be a party.  We therefore direct 
that Rene be reinstated as a defendant.   
 Having concluded that Rene will be a party on the 
retrial, we must consider what effect that factor will have on 
the remaining issues.  It is significant that the jury reached 
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its verdict on negligence and damages at a time when Rene was no 
longer a defendant in the case.  On retrial, it may be that the 
jury will exonerate both Esso and Rene, or perhaps, leave Rene to 
bear full responsibility for the plaintiff's damages.  In view of 
those possibilities, it would be inequitable to have Rene bound 
by a negligence finding or a damages assessment that a jury might 
not have rendered had it been aware that he was to be the sole, 
primarily-responsible defendant.   
 We need not blind ourselves to the fact that juries are 
apt to assess larger verdicts against major corporations than 
against individuals.  Indeed, the plaintiff's ploy in dismissing 
Rene from the suit was clearly intended to focus the jury's 
attention on the deep pocket defendant, Esso.  In the 
circumstances here, the new trial must extend to all parties and 
to damages as well as liability.   
II. 
 Because we have decided that a new trial must include 
damages, we need not discuss at any length the defendant's 
contention that the verdict was excessive.  However, guidance on 
some matters that may recur on the retrial may be helpful.   
 About a month and a half after the accident, plaintiff 
returned to his job as a first class mechanic at the Virgin 
Islands Water and Power Authority.  He continued to work there 
until shortly before the trial began.  In early 1992, plaintiff 
applied for, and received, a promotion to preventive maintenance 
supervisory foreman, a position that paid approximately $44,000 
per year.  That was a substantial increase over the $30,000 he 
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received in 1991.  His earnings in 1992 were approximately 
$35,000, but the record does not disclose what part of that sum 
included the higher pay for the supervisory position. 
 At trial, the plaintiff's actuarial expert, assuming 
plaintiff would be permanently disabled, projected his gross loss 
of income to be approximately $2 million.  This calculation took 
into account both anticipated earnings and projected inflation to 
arrive at an annual increase of 5% over the plaintiff's current 
earnings.  The witness reduced the $2 million figure to its 
present value of approximately $750,000. 
 In responding to a question from the plaintiff's 
counsel on redirect examination, the expert said that, based on 
actual earnings from 1991 through 1993, the average increase in 
income was 16.1% annually, more than three times higher than the 
5% figure that he had used in projecting the gross earnings loss. 
Counsel then stated:  "So instead of two million, you would have 
a number of six million dollars, is that right?"  The expert 
replied, "Yes, ma'am, or close to it." 
 Two serious deficiencies undermine that testimony of 
counsel and expert.  There was no evidence on which the witness 
could properly base an opinion that the plaintiff's gross 
earnings would triple in the remaining seventeen years of his 
service before retirement.  The record contains no data on the 
salary scales at the Water and Power Authority and nothing to 
indicate that the plaintiff's experience and training would 
qualify him for positions higher than the one he held at time of 
trial.  See Benjamin v. Peter's Farm Condominium Owners Ass'n, 
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820 F.2d 640, 642 (3d Cir. 1987) (requiring evidence to justify 
prospective earnings); Gumbs v. International Harvester, Inc., 
718 F.2d 88, 98 (3d Cir. 1983) (same).  The 16% average increase 
primarily was the result of the warping of the earnings record 
brought about by the substantial promotion from mechanic to 
supervisory foreman.  Moreover, at no time was the $6 million 
projection reduced to present worth, an obligation that plaintiff 
must shoulder.  See Gorniak v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 889 
F.2d 481, 486 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 The $6 million figure apparently had an appreciable 
influence on the size of the verdict.  In his post-trial opinion 
reviewing the damage award, the trial judge commented: "Plaintiff 
presented evidence . . . that Mr. Williams' economic damages 
alone might be estimated at almost 6 million dollars." Williams, 
886 F.Supp. at 1239.  "If the jury believed this testimony, then 
the entire $4.5 million dollar award is actually lower than the 
evidence revealed in the record of Mr. Williams' maximum economic 
damages.  If they believed this testimony, it is possible that 
they came up with the $4.5 million award without even considering 
any damages for pain and suffering.  It is quite likely that the 
jury did believe plaintiff's evidence since it was essentially 
unrebutted by the defendants."  Id. at 1241.1 
                                                           
1Because he concluded that the loss of income made up such a 
large part of the award, the trial judge did not deem it 
necessary to review other cases involving similar injuries to 
determine the reasonableness of amounts awarded for pain and 
suffering.  See Gumbs v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 823 F.2d 768 (3d 
Cir. 1987); Couch v. St. Croix Marine Inc., 667 F.Supp. 223 
(D.V.I. 1987); Erysthee v. El Nuevo Lirio Grocery, 25 V.I. 307 
(D.V.I. App. Div. 1990).  Such comparisons do provide some 
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 Because of its misleading character, such unsupported 
and speculative expert testimony should not be received into 
evidence on the retrial.   
 Another ruling that requires some comment was the 
exclusion of the testimony of Dr. Walter Pedersen, the 
plaintiff's attending physician.  Before the trial commenced, the 
court ruled in limine that defendant could not call the physician 
as a witness.  Dr. Pedersen had treated plaintiff after the 
accident and submitted a report to the plaintiff's attorney. She, 
in turn, sent a copy to the defendant's counsel.  About two years 
later, in the final pretrial order, plaintiff submitted a list of 
witnesses he proposed to call.  Dr. Pedersen's name was not 
included.  The defense, however, as part of its pretrial 
submission, listed Dr. Pedersen as a fact witness in its case.   
 After receiving the plaintiff's witness list, the 
defendant's counsel met with Dr. Pedersen.  Plaintiff had 
previously executed a broadly-worded medical information release 
that would permit such an interview.  Defense counsel did not 
tell the plaintiff's lawyer of his intention to discuss the 
plaintiff's injury with the physician.   
 The trial court based its exclusionary ruling on three 
grounds:    
 (1) despite local practice, defense counsel had failed 
to notify the plaintiff's lawyer of the interview;  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
guidance for courts in considering whether a verdict is excessive 
and we commend the use of such data.   
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 (2) the defense proposed to elicit expert opinion 
evidence from Dr. Pedersen although he had been listed in its 
pretrial submission as a fact witness; and  
 (3) Dr. Pedersen had not submitted a report of his 
opinion to plaintiff as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). 
 In DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 
1193, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1978), we discussed the factors that must 
be assessed in excluding a witness's testimony because of failure 
to comply with pretrial notice requirements:   
 1. the prejudice or surprise in fact to the opposing 
party; 
 
 2. the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; 
 
 3. the extent to which the orderly and efficient 
trial of the case would be disrupted; and   
 
 4. bad faith in failing to comply with the court's 
order.   
 
 
In addition, the significance of the practical importance of the 
excluded evidence must be taken into consideration.  Id. at 202. 
See also Johnson v. H.K. Webster, Inc., 775 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 
1985); Stich v. United States, 730 F.2d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 We find no evidence of surprise to plaintiff in the 
rather unusual situation present here.  Plaintiff had previously 
obtained a report from Dr. Pedersen, and we may assume that he 
had been interviewed by the plaintiff's counsel.  There was no 
indication that the trial would have been disrupted by receiving 
the physician's testimony.   
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 The trial court apparently felt bound by a local policy 
articulated by the Territorial Court in Chase v. People's Drug 
Store, 24 V.I. 183, 187 (Terr. Ct. 1989), which required the 
plaintiff's counsel to be notified before a defense lawyer 
interviewed an attending physician.  Dismissing the written 
authorization to release medical information, the district court 
noted that despite similar waivers in Chase, the Territorial 
Court adopted the practice of a New Jersey case, Stempler v. 
Speidell, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985).  Stempler required prior 
notification to the plaintiff's counsel before defendant could 
interview an attending physician.   
 We have reservations about the restrictions imposed in 
Stempler and believe the better approach is expressed in 
International Business Mach. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37 (2d 
Cir. 1975).  There, the court referred to "time-honored and 
decision-honored principles, namely, that counsel for all parties 
have a right to interview an adverse party's witnesses (the 
witness willing) in private, without the presence or consent of 
opposing counsel and without a transcript being made."  Id. at 
42.  We are concerned that the Chase holding hinders settlement 
negotiations and trial preparation by restricting the gathering 
of relevant evidence in an informal fashion, thus requiring the 
more expensive and time-consuming procedures of a formal 
deposition.      
 Furthermore, by putting his physical condition at 
issue, plaintiff waived the physician-patient privilege with 
respect to the injuries claimed to have been incurred in the 
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accident.  See 5 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 855(4) (1967); Fed. R. 
Evid. 501.   
 In any event, even failure to follow the Chase 
procedure would not provide sufficient cause to bar Dr. 
Pedersen's testimony in this case where plaintiff had received a 
report from the physician and had decided not to call him as a 
witness.  The 1970 Advisory Committee report to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(4) noted that for discovery purposes, an expert witness who 
was an actor or viewer of the occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the lawsuit should be treated "as an ordinary witness." 
That same viewpoint is applicable here in the trial setting. 
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 The significance of Dr. Pedersen's testimony is 
apparent from the dispute over whether the plaintiff's back 
condition was caused solely by the automobile accident in 1990. 
Our review of the trial record reveals references to previous 
injuries to the plaintiff's lower back in 1969, 1975, 1978, 1980, 
1981, 1982 (two incidents), 1983, and 1986.  In 1990, shortly 
before the accident in this suit, he also had an x-ray of the 
lower back.   
 Dr. Pedersen treated plaintiff for some of these 
previous injuries as well as those incurred in the auto accident 
in December of 1990.  The extent of the plaintiff's disability 
caused by the pre-existing injuries and that portion attributable 
to the Rene collision are crucial in the determination of a 
proper damage award.  It seems likely that Dr. Pedersen's 
testimony would be helpful to making an evaluation on causation, 
and he should be permitted to testify at the retrial.  Of course, 
the trial court may require the defense to produce, in advance of 
trial, a report by Dr. Pedersen of any additional matters, 
including opinions that he intends to testify about, that had not 
been included in any previous reports to, or interviews with, the 
plaintiff's counsel.   
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 Because other evidentiary matters raised by the defense 
may be obviated on the retrial, we do not address nor decide them 
at this juncture. 
 The judgment of the district court will be reversed and 
the case remanded for a new trial.  Costs to abide the event.   
___________________________________ 
 
